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Abstract
We study algorithms for combinatorial market design problems, where a set of heterogeneous and in-
divisible objects are priced and sold to potential buyers subject to equilibrium constraints. Extending the
CWE notion introduced by Feldman et al. [STOC 2013], we introduce the concept of a Market-Clearing
Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibium (MC-CWE) as a natural relaxation of the classical Walrasian equi-
librium (WE) solution concept. The only difference between a MC-CWE and a WE is the ability for
the seller to bundle the items prior to sale. This innocuous and natural bundling operation imposes a
plethora of algorithmic and economic challenges and opportunities. Unlike WE, which is guaranteed
to exist only for (gross) substitutes valuations, a MC-CWE always exists. The main algorithmic chal-
lenge, therefore, is to design computationally efficient mechanisms that generate MC-CWE outcomes
that approximately maximize social welfare. For a variety of valuation classes encompassing substitutes
and complements (including super-additive, single-minded and budget-additive valuations), we design
polynomial-time MC-CWE mechanisms that provide tight welfare approximation results.
1 Introduction
The resource allocation problem lies at the heart of theoretical economics: how should scarce resources
be allocated among individual agents with competing interests? Since the emergence of the Internet, which
enables complex resource allocation on a grand scale, this has naturally become a central problem in computer
science as well. Economists generally approach this problem by adopting the notion of market equilibrium.
Broadly speaking, a market equilibrium is a set of resource prices that are stable in the sense that all agents
are maximally happy with their allocations and no resources are left unallocated. A long line of work has
been dedicated to addressing the existence of equilibrium prices, and it has been shown (see, e.g., [2]) that
market equilibria exist very generally, as long as the market is convex.
While this result sounds appealing in its generality, the convexity assumption usually requires that re-
sources be infinitely divisible. In many applications of interest, especially those with a computational aspect,
resources are indivisible; in these cases the convexity assumption is inapplicable. Do the results from the
convex environments carry over to non-convex environments? In general the answer is no: the existence of
equilibrium prices is not guaranteed. As a result, the study of markets for indivisible goods tends to focus on
specific cases for which such prices exists, such as when buyer values satisfy the gross substitutes condition.
To be more precise, consider the following concrete model. Suppose there are m indivisible and hetero-
geneous items that should be allocated among n agents. The agents have potentially arbitrary preferences
over bundles of items. Formally, every agent i ∈ [n] has a valuation function vi that maps every subset S of
items into the value vi(S) that agent i derives from the bundle S (in monetary terms). Given a price vector
p = (p1, . . . , pm), a bundle S is said to be in agent i’s demand set if S maximizes i’s utility given p, defined
as the difference between vi(S) and
∑
j∈S pj .
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A Walrasian equilibrium (WE) is an assignment of item prices to the m items, and an assignment of
the objects to the agents, such that: (1) every agent is allocated a bundle in his demand set, and (2) the
market clears; i.e., all items are allocated1 . Such a solution is truly appealing; every agent is maximally
happy despite competing preferences, the market clears, and the pricing structure is natural, simple, and
transparent. Unfortunately, WE do not exist in general. A WE is guaranteed to exist only for a rather narrow
class of valuations, known as gross substitutes (GS) valuations (a strict subset of submodular functions)
[23]. This eliminates any hope for the applicability of WE to environments with valuations that exhibit
complementarities, and many forms of substitutes as well.
Recently, Feldman et al. [18] proposed a relaxation of WE, termed a combinatorial Walrasian equilibrium
(CWE). In a CWE, the seller can choose to bundle objects prior to assigning prices. This is a natural power
to afford the seller, since as the owner of the resources he has some inherent ability to define what is meant
by an “item.” The generated bundles induce a reduced market — a market in which the items for sale are
the bundles generated by the seller. In addition to the bundling operation, the CWE further relaxes the WE
notion in that it allows for items to remain unallocated (even when they are priced above zero). It is easy to
see that a CWE exists for any valuation profile, since the seller could bundle all objects into a single item.
The important issue, then, is whether there exists a CWE that is (approximately) efficient with respect to
social welfare. Indeed, Feldman et al. show there always exists a CWE with at least half of the optimal
(unconstrained) social welfare [18].
The CWE notion relaxes the WE notion in two ways: (i) it allows bundling, (ii) it does not require
market clearance. While the bundling relaxation is central to the notion of CWE, the second relaxation
warrants some discussion. The relaxation of market clearance is somewhat at odds with the notion of a two-
sided market equilibrium: prices might not be stable from the seller’s perspective. After all, if an object
(i.e. bundle) does not sell, the seller may be tempted to decrease its price in order to to sell it and increase
revenue. The concept of CWE therefore implicitly requires that the seller pre-commit to (sub-optimal) prices,
in addition to committing to a bundling of the items. With this in mind, we consider whether the relaxation of
market clearance is truly necessary. It is easy to see that the bundling relaxation alone is enough to guarantee
existence of an equilibrium, so the question becomes one of welfare. Can we hope to achieve the welfare
bound of [18] without relaxing market clearance?
To answer this question we define the notion of a Market-clearing CWE (MC-CWE), which allows the
bundling operation, but requires market clearance. A MC-CWE is, therefore, precisely a WE over the reduced
market; it differs from a WE only in the ability of the seller to pre-bundle the items, and in particular it is a
stronger (more restrictive) concept than CWE.
For a number of valuation classes, encompassing both substitutes and complements, we provide two
types of results. The first finds the fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be obtained in a MC-
CWE outcome. The second addresses the same problem but under the additional requirement of operating
in polynomial time. Note that the approximation result established in [18] is only semi-computational —
given the optimal allocation, it finds in polynomial time a CWE outcome that gives at least a half of the
optimal welfare. Here, we devise polynomial approximation algorithms that do not need any initial allocation.
Moreover, all of our approximation results match the computational lower bounds for their corresponding
valuation classes.
We note that while the focus of our paper is welfare maximization, our analysis and results have some
immediate implications on revenue maximization. In particular, all of our approximation results carry over
to revenue approximation, since for each of our mechanisms the bound we obtain on the social welfare is
precisely the revenue extracted at equilibrium. We also observe that from a revenue maximization perspective,
MC-CWE might be preferred over WE even for GS valuations, as it can extract arbitrarily higher revenue
than any WE solution (see Appendix B).
1More precisely, every unallocated item is priced at zero.
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Uniform BA Uniform BA Single minded Super additive
identical budgets
MC-CWE gap 1 ≥ 8/7 1 1≤ 2
Poly-time MC-CWE approx. ≤ 4/3 ≤ 8/3 O(m/
√
logm) [value] θ(√m)
θ(
√
m) [demand]
Figure 1: Summary of our approximation results. The columns correspond to valuation classes. The first
column corresponds to uniform budget additive valuations with identical budgets, and the second column
corresponds to uniform budget additive valuations with arbitrary budgets. The first row corresponds to the gap
in social welfare due to MC-CWE, disregarding computational considerations. The second row corresponds
to the approximation that can be achieved with a MC-CWE poly-time mechanism. All approximation results
assume the value-query model, unless otherwise stated. Note that m is the number of items for sale.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
We construct MC-CWE mechanisms with certain welfare guarantees for various valuation classes. These
results are stated below and summarized in Table 1.1.
Super-additive valuations In the case where agent valuations are super-additive, we show that there always
exists a MC-CWE that maximizes social welfare. Note that it is not always possible to maximize social
welfare without bundling, even if the market clearance requirement is relaxed: there exist input instances in
which all bidders are single-minded, but every outcome with item pricing obtains only an O(
√
m) fraction
of the optimal social welfare [17]. The use of bundling is therefore crucial in generating a socially efficient
equilibrium outcome.
We next turn to computational algorithms. We show how to construct a MC-CWE that obtains an O(
√
m)
approximation to the optimal social welfare in a polynomial number of demand queries2, matching known
lower bounds [31]. This mechanism is new; as far as we are aware, existing O(√m)-approximations do
not satisfy the conditions of MC-CWE. Our mechanism proceeds by first crafting an O(
√
m)-approximate
allocation and prices, then applying local search to repeatedly satisfy agent demands (bundling objects and/or
raising prices in the process) until every agent obtains a demanded set at the given prices. Our construction
makes use of demand queries in a way similar to that of [18]: rather than querying demand sets over the
original space of objects, we query demand over bundles of objects (under linear prices). With value queries,
we show that the O(m/
√
logm)-approximate mechanism due to [25] satisfies the MC-CWE property. We
also show that in the case of single-minded valuations, our demand-query mechanism can be modified to
achieve an O(
√
m) approximation in a polynomial number of value queries.
Sub-additive valuations: uniform budget additive We then turn to the space of sub-additive valuations.
Since efficient WE exist for the class of GS valuations, efficient MC-CWE exist for this class as well. We
therefore consider a class of non-GS valuations: those that are uniform budget-additive. In this auction
problem, each item a has a common value va, and each agent values the item at either 0 or va. Furthermore,
each bidder has a budget that limits his value for any set of items. For this class, we demonstrate that WE
do not necessarily exist. Moreover, we provide an instance in which no MC-CWE can achieve more than a
7/8 fraction of the optimal social welfare. On the other hand, we show any allocation can be converted (in
polynomial time) into a MC-CWE outcome that achieves at least half of the original social welfare. Thus, at
least half of the optimal welfare can always be achieved in a MC-CWE outcome.
Turning to computational consideration, the welfare-maximization problem for this valuation class is
known to be APX-hard, and the best-known algorithm achieves an approximation of 4/3 (see [1, 5, 11, 35]).
2A demand query returns the utility-maximizing set given a vector of item prices.
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Combined with the aforementioned algorithm, which converts every outcome to a MC-CWE outcome with
at least half of the welfare of the original outcome, this implies a MC-CWE mechanism that achieves a 8/3
approximation. Our analysis is based on the observation that an outcome can be implemented at MC-CWE
if and only if that outcome is an optimal solution (among all fractional solutions) to a certain linear program:
the configuration LP for the assignment problem restricted to the bundles in the outcome allocation. Our
construction is based upon local search, but of a different nature than our super-additive mechanism. Rather
than attempting to improve social welfare, we repeatedly bundle objects to reduce the optimal fractional
welfare, shrinking the gap between fractional and integral solutions to the configuration LP.
We further show that if agents have identical budgets, the factor-2 loss disappears: any allocation can be
made MC-CWE without loss in social welfare. Yet, even within this restricted class, a Walrasian equilibrium
may not exist. These results are driven by connections between MC-CWE and the configuration LP for the
combinatorial assignment problem.
1.2 Relation to Prior Work
There is a long line of work studying pricing equilibria in theoretical economics. [21] and [36] initiated the
study of envy-freeness outcomes. Market-clearing prices in the market assignment problem were studied
by [34]. Subsequent works have studied conditions for the existence of Walrasian equilibria [3, 8, 23, 26, 27].
An alternative to Walrasian equilibrium is to allow a seller to set (non-linear) prices on arbitrary bundles.
Such package auctions were formalized by [9]. Some notable examples of combinatorial auction mechanisms
that make use of bundle prices can be found in [4], [37], and [33]. Our notion of MC-CWE differs from
package auctions in that the seller commits to a partition of the objects, then sets linear prices over those
bundles.
[19] study an extension of envy-freeness, multi-envy-freeness, in which no agent envies any subset
of other agents. This concept is related to our notion of MC-CWE. However, crucially, they restrict their
definition to agents with single-minded types, which dampens the distinction from envy-freeness.
Many of our mechanisms access agent valuations via demand queries, whereby agents provide feedback
to sellers through their choice of demand set at a given price vector. See [6, 10, 15, 28] for discussions on the
power of the demand query model.
The assignment problem with budget-additive bidders has received significant attention in purely algo-
rithmic frameworks. [1] present an algorithm with approximation factor (1 − 1/e), and also introduce the
value-uniform variant of the problem. This approximation factor was subsequently improved [5, 35], leading
eventually to a 4/3 approximation algorithm due to [11].
In a related paper, [22] introduce the notion of conditional equilibrium, a relaxation of WE in which no
buyer wishes to add additional items to his allocation under the given prices. They show that every conditional
equilibrium achieves at least half of the optimal social welfare, and a conditional equilibrium always exists
when buyers have submodular valuations. Our equilibrium concept MC-CWE differs in that it is based on
reducing the space of objects via bundling, rather than relaxing the notion of envy-freeness directly.
2 Preliminaries
The auction setting considered in this work consists of a set M of m indivisible objects and a set of n agents.
Each agent has a valuation function vi(·) : 2M → R≥0 that indicates his value for every set of objects, is
non-decreasing (i.e., vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) for every S ⊆ T ⊆ M ) and is normalized so that vi(∅) = 0. The profile
of agent valuations is denoted by v = (v1, . . . , vn), and an auction setting is defined by a tuple A = (M,v).
A price vector p = (p1, . . . , pm) consists of a price pj for each object j ∈M . An allocation is a vector of
sets x = (x0, x1, . . . , xn), where xi∩xk = ∅ for every i 6= k, and
⋃n
i=0 xi = M . In the allocation x, for every
i ∈ N , xi is the bundle assigned to agent i, and x0 is the set of unallocated objects; i.e., x0 = M \
⋃n
i=1 xi.
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As standard, we assume that each agent has a quasi-linear utility function; i.e., the utility of agent i
being allocated bundle xi under prices p is ui(xi,p) = vi(xi) −
∑
j∈xi
pj. Given prices p, the demand
correspondence Di(p) of agent i contains the sets of objects that maximize agent i’s utility:
Di(p) =
{
S∗ : S∗ ∈ argmax
S⊆M
{ui(S,p)}
}
.
A tuple (x,p) is said to be buyer stable for auction A = (M,v) if xi ∈ Di(p) for every i ∈ N . A tuple
(x,p) is said to be seller stable for auction A = (M,v) if for every j ∈ x0, pj = 0. The seller stability
condition is also known as market clearance.
A tuple (x,p) is said to be a Walrasian equilibrium (WE) for auction A = (M,v) if it is both buyer
stable and seller stable.
It is well known that a WE exists only under restricted valuation functions. In particular, the class of
gross substitutes (GS) valuations is a maximal class that admits Walrasian equilibria [23]. This class is a
strict subset of submodular valuations. It is also known that if a WE exists, it is economically efficient (i.e.,
maximizes social welfare — the sum of agents’ valuations).
We next define the notion of a Market-Clearing CWE (MC-CWE). The crux of the concept is that items
are pre-partitioned into indivisible bundles. The constructed bundles are treated as indivisible objects, and the
MC-CWE notion reduces to WE over the bundles. Crucially, although prices are now associated with bundles
(of the original market), unlike previous notions, prices are linear once bundles are fixed. A formal definition
follows.
For a partition A = (A1, . . . ,Ak) of the item set M we slightly abuse notation and denote by A =
{A1, . . . ,Ak} the reduced set of items, where the valuation of each agent i of a subset S ⊆ A is vi(
⋃
j:Aj∈S
Aj).
We denote by AA an auction over the reduced set of items A with the induced valuation profile.
Every allocation x induces a partition A(x) = (x0, . . . , xn). A tuple (x,p), where x = (x0, . . . , xn),
and pi is the price of xi for every xi 6= ∅, is a Market-Clearing CWE (MC-CWE) if (x,p) is a WE in the
auction AA(x). An allocation x is said to be MC-CWE if it admits a price vector p ∈ Rn+1≥0 such that (x,p)
is MC-CWE. A mechanism is said to be MC-CWE if it maps every valuation profile v to an outcome (x,p)
that is MC-CWE.
Relation to Combinatorial Walrasian equilibrium (CWE)
A tuple (x,p), where x = (x0, . . . , xn), and pi is the price of xi for every xi 6= ∅, is a CWE if (x,p) is
buyer stable in the auction AA(x). Note that a MC-CWE is weaker than a WE, since it allows for a pre-sale
partition of the goods. On the other hand, MC-CWE is stronger than a CWE, since it requires seller stability
on top of buyer stability.
The MC-CWE concept is also closely related to the notion of envy-freeness. See more on this relation in
Appendix A.
2.1 Characterization
The characterization of a CWE allocation is closely related to the characterization of an allocation that can be
supported in a WE [8]. A similar observation was already given in [18], but we state it here for completeness,
as it is used in later sections.
For a given partition A of the objects, the allocation of A to N can be specified by a set of integral
variables y
i,S
∈ {0, 1}, where y
i,S
= 1 if the set S ⊆ A is allocated to agent i ∈ N and y
i,S
= 0 otherwise.
These variables should satisfy the following conditions:
∑
S yi,S ≤ 1 for every i ∈ N (each agent is allocated
to at most one bundle) and ∑
i,S⊇Aj
y
i,S
≤ 1 for every Aj ∈ A (each element of the partition is allocated to
at most one agent). A fractional allocation of A is given by variables y
i,S
∈ [0, 1] that satisfy the same
conditions and intuitively might be viewed as an allocation of divisible items. The configuration LP for AA
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is given by the following linear program, which computes the fractional allocation that maximizes social
welfare.
max
∑
i,S
vi(S) · yi,S
s.t.
∑
S
y
i,S
≤ 1 for every i ∈ N
∑
i,S⊇Aj
y
i,S
≤ 1 for every Aj ∈ A
y
i,S
∈ [0, 1] for every i ∈ N,S ⊆ A
The characterization given in [8] states that a WE exists if and only if the optimal fractional solution to the
allocation LP occurs at an integral solution. This characterization of a WE allocation can be used to derive a
characterization of a MC-CWE allocation.
Recall that every allocation x induces a partition A(x) = (x0, . . . , xn). The WE characterization implies
the following MC-CWE characterization.
Claim 2.1. An allocation x = (x0, x1, . . . , xn) is a MC-CWE for A iff the configuration LP for AA(x) has
an integral optimal solution that sets y
i,xi
= 1 for all i ∈ N .
In light of Claim 2.1, the problem of finding a MC-CWE allocation is equivalent to the problem of finding
bundles such that the optimal social welfare generated by fractional and integral allocations of these bundles
are identical, then returning an efficient allocation of those bundles.
Gap in social welfare due to MC-CWE: a lower bound. In [18], a lower bound on the social welfare
of any CWE allocation is established. Specifically, using the equivalence of Claim 2.1, it is shown that the
welfare of any CWE allocation is at most 2/3 of the welfare of an optimal (non-CWE) allocation. We note that
the same example trivially carries over to the stronger notion of MC-CWE; i.e., the welfare of any MC-CWE
allocation is at most 2/3 of the optimal welfare. The established lower bound holds for general valuations,
but disappears for some families of valuation functions (as will be shown in later sections of this paper).
3 Super-additive valuations
In this section we study MC-CWE outcomes when agent valuations are super-additive. We first show that
there is no loss in efficiency due to MC-CWE. In particular, every efficient allocation is MC-CWE.
We say that allocation x is bundle-efficient for v if, for all functions β : [n]→ [n], we have∑i vi(xi) ≥∑
i vi
(⋃
j∈β−1(i) xj
)
. That is, a bundle-efficient allocation x maximizes social welfare among all ways to
allocate the (indivisible) bundles x1, . . . , xn to the agents.
Theorem 3.1. If agents are super-additive and x is a bundle-efficient allocation, then the price vector pi =
vi(xi) is such that (x,p) is MC-CWE.
Proof. Pick any agent i and set of agents S. If i ∈ S, then
vi(xi)− pi = 0 ≥ vi(∪j∈Sxj)−
∑
j∈S
vj(xj) = vi(∪j∈Sxj)−
∑
j∈S
pj ,
where the inequality follows from the efficiency of allocation x. Consider next the case where i 6∈ S. It holds
that
vi(xi) +
∑
j∈S
vj(xj) ≥ vi(∪j∈S∪{i}xj) ≥ vi(xi) + vi(∪j∈Sxj),
6
where the first inequality follows from the efficiency of allocation x, and the second inequality follows from
the super additivity of vi. It follows that
vi(xi)− pi = 0 ≥ vi(∪j∈Sxj)−
∑
j∈S
vj(xj) = vi(∪j∈Sxj)−
∑
j∈S
pj .
The assertion of the theorem follows.
A consequence of Theorem 3.1 is that the full surplus can always be extracted by the seller as revenue.
We note that the use of bundling is necessary for the statement of Theorem 3.1, even if we relax the
market-clearing requirement of Walrasian equilibrium and even for single-minded bidders. There are known
auction instances for which, given any set of item prices for which agent demand sets are disjoint, the social
welfare of the resulting allocation is an O(
√
m) fraction of the optimal social welfare [17]. For completeness
we describe such an example in Appendix C.
3.1 Polynomial-Time Mechanisms
We next study the power of poly-time approximation mechanisms for maximizing social welfare in MC-
CWE outcomes (compared to the optimal welfare that can be achieved by any mechanism, poly-time or
not, MC-CWE or not). Of particular interest is the question whether the MC-CWE requirement entails
an additional loss on top of the loss incurred due to the poly-time requirement alone. In our analysis, we
distinguish between mechanisms that operate in the value-query and demand-query models, as is standard
in the literature. We find that in both models, it is possible to construct a MC-CWE mechanism with an
approximation factor matching that of the best-known approximation algorithms for welfare maximization.
In particular, there exists a poly-time MC-CWE mechanism that achieves anO(
√
m) approximation under the
demand-query model, and a poly-time MC-CWE mechanism that achieves an O(m/
√
logm) approximation
under the value-query model.
We first present a MC-CWE approximation mechanism for superadditive valuations using demand queries.
This mechanism, which we call SuperAdditiveMC-CWE is listed as Algorithm 1. proceeds in two phases. In
the first phase, it builds a preliminary solution by repeatedly allocating the set that maximizes value density.
That is, set S is allocated to agent i so that vi(S)/|S| is maximized, and this process is then iterated on the
remaining items. A bidder can be allocated to multiple times in this phase, in which case she is allocated the
union of the assigned sets. After all objects have been allocated in this manner, we check whether the welfare
can be improved by allocating all objects to a single player; if so, we do so and the mechanism ends. Other-
wise we proceed to phase 2, where we repeatedly apply local improvements to the allocation. Specifically, if
we write (x1, . . . , xn) for the tentative allocation, we look for circumstances in which some player i has more
value for a set of bundles from among {x1, . . . , xn} than the players to whom those bundles were previously
assigned; if such a case exists, we bundle all of these items together and reallocate them to player i, then re-
peat the process with this updated tentative allocation. Note that this step amounts to repeatedly satisfying the
demand of a player in the market with items {x1, . . . , xn} and prices pi = vi(xi), until no further demands
are made (which must occur since these prices only increase). When this process terminates we return the
resulting allocation. The following theorem establishes the O(
√
m) approximation and polynomial run time
of the algorithm.
Theorem 3.2. Algorithm SuperAdditiveMC-CWE returns a MC-CWE outcome that O(
√
m)-approximates
the optimal social welfare over all assignments. Furthermore, it can be implemented in a polynomial number
of demand queries.
To prove Theorem 3.2, we first note that the loop on lines 11-14 of Algorithm 1 must halt after polyno-
mially many iterations. The reason is that, on each interation of the loop, the number of players j such that
xj = ∅ increases by at least one, except in the case where |T | = 1 and xi = ∅. Consider a sequence of
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Algorithm 1 SuperAdditiveMC-CWE
Require: Additive valuations v1, . . . , vn.
1: Initialize R←M , xi ← ∅ for each i ∈ N
// Phase 1: Build initial allocation
2: repeat
3: (i, S)← argmaxi∈[n],S⊆R{vi(S)/|S|}
4: xi ← xi ∪ S, R← R\S;
5: until R = ∅
6: if ∃i ∈ [n] such that vi(M) >
∑
j vj(xj) then xi ←M and xj ← ∅ for all j 6= i;
// Phase 2: Local search
7: while ∃i ∈ [n], T ⊆ N such that vi(∪j∈Txj) >
∑
j∈T vj(xj) do
8: Choose i ∈ [n] and T ⊆ N maximizing vi(∪j∈Txj)−
∑
j∈T vj(xj).
9: xi ← xi ∪ (∪j∈Txj), xj ← ∅ for all j ∈ T\{i}
10: end while
11: return x
iterations of the loop during which the number of players with empty allocations does not increase. In each
iteration, since we choose the i and T = {j} that maximizes vi(xj)− vj(xj), a certain player i can be chosen
only once during this sequence. This sequence of iterations therefore has length at most n. Since the number
of players with empty allocations can increase at most n times, we conclude that this loop must halt after at
most n2 iterations.
We next analyze the number of demand queries needed to implement Algorithm 1.
Lemma 3.3. Algorithm 1 can be implemented in a polynomial number of demand queries.
Proof. It is clear that all operations other than lines 3, 11, and 12 can be implemented in polynomial time, so
we will focus on those. Line 3 can be implemented with n Relative-demand query in the sense of Blumrosen
and Nisan [10]. A relative demand query involves generating a vector p of non-zero object prices, and returns
the set S maximizing vi(S)/
∑
i∈S pi. Line 3 can be implemented by posing a demand query to each bidder
with the price vector that assigns a price of 1 to each item in R and an arbitrarily large price to each item in
M\R. Since a relative demand query can be implemented by a polynomial number of demand queries [10],
Line 3 can be implemented in polynomially many demand queries as well.
Lines 11 and 12 can be implemented as follows. We focus on line 12; line 11 can be implemented in the
same way. We will define a new auction instance, over the original player set N and a new set of objects
{a′1, . . . , a′n}. Object a′i is intended to represent the set xi in the original auction. Given some T ⊆ [n], the
value of player i for some object set x′ = {a′j : j ∈ T} will be defined as vi′(x′) := vi(∪j∈Txj). Note
that this new auction corresponds precisely to the original auction with the objects partitioned into indivisible
bundles x1, . . . , xn. We can then implement line 12 by making a single demand query to each agent i, with
respect to this new bundled auction, under prices given by p′j = vj(xj). If any player has positive value for
the demanded set returned by this query, then this player and his demanded set will satisfy the condition on
line 12. Whichever player has the highest positive value, plus his demanded set, will be one chosen on line
12. If every player has value 0 for his demanded set, then the condition on line 9 evaluates to false.
To show correctness, we first show that SuperAdditiveMC-CWE generates a MC-CWE outcome, then
bound the social welfare of the outcome it returns.
Claim 3.4. Algorithm SuperAdditiveMC-CWE generates a MC-CWE outcome.
Proof. The outcome x generated by SuperAdditiveMC-CWE is such that, for all i ∈ [n] and all T ⊆ N ,
vi(∪j∈Txj) ≤
∑
j∈T vj(xj). Thus, if we set prices pi = vi(xi), we have that vi(xi)−pi = 0 ≥ vi(∪j∈Txj)−∑
j∈T pj for all i and all T ⊆ N . Thus outcome (x,p) is MC-CWE.
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Claim 3.5. Algorithm SuperAdditiveMC-CWE obtains an O(
√
m) approximation to the optimal social wel-
fare.
Proof. We will argue that, on any superadditive input profile, the social welfare generated by our mechanism
is at least that of a mechanism proposed by Blumrosen and Nisan, which was shown to obtain an O(
√
m)
approximation to the optimal social welfare [10]. The mechanism due to Blumrosen and Nisan, which we
will refer to as the BN mechanism, is identical to the first phase of our mechanism, except that it only allows
a single set to be allocated to any single player in the loop on lines 2-5.
Consider first the case in which all agents are single-minded. In this case, phase 1 of our mechanism is
identical to the BN mechanism (since our mechanism can allocate to any agent at most once in lines 2-6, by
single-mindedness). Thus, after phase 1, the preliminary allocation generated by our mechanism has social
welfare equal to that of the BN mechanism. We then note that the social welfare of the allocation can only
increase over each iteration of the loop at lines 11-15. This is because, whenever the condition on line 11
evaluates to true, it must be that xi = ∅ (again, due to single-mindedness), so the increase in value to agent
i is greater than the decrease in value to each agent j ∈ T . We conclude that the social welfare of the final
allocation is at least that of the allocation returned by the BN mechanism.
We now consider the general case of superadditive valuations. We will compare our auction with a cor-
responding auction in which each original superadditive bidder is represented by 2m single-minded bidders,
one for each subset of M . That is, for each i ∈ [n] and S ⊆ M , we will have a bidder (i, S) with a single-
minded value of vi(S) for set S. Note first that the optimal social welfare for this new auction is identical to
that of the original auction. Also, since this is an auction over single-minded bidders, our mechanism obtains
at least as much social welfare as the BN auction for this new auction instance (as argued above). We will
now argue that our mechanism obtains at least as much welfare in the original auction as in the new auction
instance; this will complete the proof.
The only difference in the mechanism’s behavior on these two input instances is that, on line 4 or 13, we
may allocate multiple times to a single agent in the original input instance, whereas in the expanded auction
instance these allocations are to separate bidders. Note, however, that if we allocate multiple sets S1, . . . , Sk
to a player i in the original instance, then we allocate precisely to players (i, S1), . . . , (i, Sk) in the expanded
instance. Since bidder valuations are superadditive, the value of allocating multiple disjoint sets to a single
bidder cannot be less than the value of allocating these sets separately to single-minded bidders with the same
valuations. We conclude that the welfare generated by our mechanism in the original auction is at least that
of the BN mechanism in the corresponding auction with single-minded types, and hence obtains an O(
√
m)
approximation to social welfare as required.
We next move to the value-query model. We show that the O(m/
√
logm) approximation mechanism
due to [25] is guaranteed to generate CWE outcomes. We note that it nearly matches the lower bound of
O(m/ logm) on the approximability of CAs with superadditive bidders (using value queries) [28].
Theorem 3.6. If agents are super-additive, then there exists a mechanism that makes a polynomial number
of value queries and generates a CWE outcome that achieves a O(m/√logm) approximation to the optimal
social welfare.
Proof. The mechanism groups the objects into logm bundles, each of size m/ logm, arbitrarily. It then
returns the bundle-efficient allocation over those bundles. This is known to achieve a O(m/
√
logm) ap-
proximation, and can be implemented in a polynomial number of value queries [25]. Since the allocation is
bundle-efficient, it is CWE.
3.2 Single-minded Valuations and Value Queries
In the special case in which agents are single-minded, Algorithm 1 can be improved to run in a polynomial
number of value queries, obtaining an O(
√
m) approximation to the optimal welfare. This mechanism is
new; as far as we are aware, existing O(
√
m)-approximation mechanisms do not satisfy MC-CWE.
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Algorithm 2 SingleMindedMC-CWE
Require: Single-minded valuations (v1, S1), . . . , (vn, Sn).
// Phase 1: Players with small desired sets
1: Q← {i ∈ N : |Si| ≤
√
m}
2: x← outcome of greedily allocating sets to players in Q, by value.
3: for each object ai not allocated in x do
4: add ai to an arbitrary non-empty element of x
5: end for
// Phase 2: Players with large desired sets
6: for i ∈ N −Q, in decreasing order of vi do
7: Ci ← {j : xj ∩ Si 6= ∅}
8: if vi >
∑
j∈Ci
vj then xi ← ∪j∈Cixj , xj ← ∅ for each j ∈ Ci;
9: end for
10: return x
Our algorithm, which we call SingleMindedMC-CWE and listed as Algorithm 2, proceeds as follows.
We split the bidders into two groups: those with “small” desired sets (of size at most √m) and those with
larger desired sets. We first generate a provisional allocation that only includes the bidders with small desired
sets. We construct this preliminary allocation greedily: we order players from largest value to smallest, then
allocate to players in this order if their desired set is available. Any object that is left unallocated is then
added to an arbitrary non-empty allocation. Then, in the second phase of the algorithm, we consider those
bidders with large desired sets. We order these large-set bidders from highest value to smallest, and for each
bidder i in this order, say with value vi for set Si, we ask whether vi is greater than the sum of values of
all players whose allocations intersect set Si. If so, we take all of those intersecting allocations from their
respective bidders and allocate them all to player i. After this operation has been completed for every large-
set bidder (in order from highest value to smallest), we return the resulting allocation. The following theorem
establishes the O(
√
m) approximation and polynomial run time of the algorithm.
Theorem 3.7. When agent valuations are single-minded, Algorithm SingleMindedMC-CWE returns a MC-
CWE outcome that O(
√
m)-approximates the optimal social welfare over all assignments. Furthermore, it
can be implemented in a polynomial number of value queries.
The runtime requirement of Theorem 3.7 is immediate from the definition of Algorithm 2. We address
the approximation and MC-CWE requirements separately.
Lemma 3.8. Algorithm 2 obtains an O(
√
m) approximation when agents are single-minded.
Proof. We first note that, upon each iteration of loop 6−12, the social welfare of allocation x cannot decrease.
This is because, on each iteration, the allocation is altered precisely when the value of player i for set ∪j∈Cixj
is greater than the value being obtained from these objects in the pre-existing allocation.
After line 2, the allocation x corresponds to the outcome of the greedy allocation among bids for sets of
size at most
√
m. Thus, since social welfare does not decrease from this point onward, the final allocation
generates at least the welfare of this greedy outcome.
Next, suppose that i is the player for which vi is maximized. We will show that our algorithm generates
social welfare at least vi. If i ∈ Q, then we will have Si ⊆ xi after line 2, so our algorithm’s welfare must be
at least vi. Otherwise, i will be the first agent considered in the loop starting at line 3. If vi is larger than the
value generated by our algorithm before this first iteration, then the condition on line 8 must evaluate true and
we will have Si ⊆ xi after the first iteration of the loop. Thus, again, our algorithm’s welfare must therefore
be at least vi. In either case, our mechanism obtains welfare at least maxi vi.
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We therefore have that our mechanism generates at least as much welfare as an algorithm that chooses the
welfare-maximizing outcome between (a) the greedy allocation among bids for sets of size at most √m, and
(b) allocating all items to a single bidder. However, it is known that such an allocation obtains an O(√m)
approximation to the optimal social welfare [30]. Since our mechanism generates at least this much welfare,
it must be an O(
√
m) approximation as well.
Lemma 3.9. Let x be the allocation returned by Algorithm 2, and consider price vector pi = vi(xi). Then
(x,p) is MC-CWE.
Proof. For a given fixed input profile, let Q = {i ∈ [n] : |Si| ≤ √m} be the set of agents with “small”
demand sets and let x be allocation chosen by the mechanism. For each player i such that xi = ∅, let
Ci = {j : xj ∩ Si 6= ∅}. It suffices to show that, for each i such that xi = ∅, we have vi ≤
∑
j∈Ci
vj . (Since
Si ⊆ xi whenever xi 6= ∅).
Observe that, after line 5, the allocation xj forms a partition of the set of objects. We also note that, for
agent i, the value of
∑
j∈Ci
vj can only increase over each iteration of the loop on lines 4-8. This is because,
for each object ai, the value of the player j such that ai ∈ xj can only increase (since the allocation only
changes when a set of objects is transferred to a player with value at least that of all previous owners of those
objects).
Let i be some player such that xi = ∅. Suppose i ∈ Q, and that i did not receive his desired set from the
greedy allocation on line 2. Then, since xi = ∅, it must be that vi ≤ max{j ∈ Q, j 6= i, Sj ∩ Si 6= ∅ : vj}
(from the definition of the greedy algorithm). Since the values of winners only increase over the course of the
mechanism, we must have vi ≤ max{j, xj ∩ Si 6= ∅ : vj} and hence vi ≤
∑
j∈Ci
vj .
Next suppose that i 6∈ Q, and the condition on line 6 does not evaluate to true when agent i is considered
on lines 4-8. Then, at this point in the algorithm we have vi ≤
∑
j∈Ci
vj , and since winner values only
increase over the course of the mechanism this will be true at the completion of the mechanism.
Finally, suppose that i is such that, on some iteration of the loop on lines 6-12, xi is initially non-empty
but is set to ∅ over the course of the iteration. Then the condition on line 8 evaluated true for some j such
that xi ∩ Sj 6= ∅, and hence after this iteration we have vi ≤ vj and Si ∩ xj 6= ∅. Since winner values only
increase over the course of the mechanism, we must have vi ≤
∑
j∈Ci
vj at the completion of the mechanism,
as required.
4 Uniform Budget-Additive Valuations
A budget-additive valuation is specified by budget B and item values vj , j ∈ M . The value of set S is then
v(S) = min{B,∑j∈S vj}. Note that the uniform-valuation case implies vi(j) ≤ Bi for all i ∈ [n], j ∈M .
The problem of maximizing social welfare with budget-additive valuations has been extensively studied in
recent years from a computational perspective [1,5,11,16,35]. It is known to be APX-hard [11], and the best
known approximation ratio is 4/3 (achieved via iterative rounding or primal-dual algorithms). This factor
also matches the integrality gap of the corresponding linear program. In this section we consider problem
instances in which agents have uniform budget-additive valuations [1], in the sense that for each object j
there is a value vj such that, for all i, vi(j) ∈ {0, vj}. In other words, each object has a fixed value vj ; each
player with non-zero value for j values it at vj . Here too, the best approximation known is 4/3.
4.1 Arbitrary budgets
We first give an example in which no MC-CWE allocation can achieve more than a 7/8 fraction of the optimal
welfare.
Claim 4.1. There is a profile of uniform budget-additive valuations for which no MC-CWE allocation achieves
more than 7/8 of the optimal welfare.
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(a) An instance of uniform budget addi-
tive bidders that admits a gap in welfare
due to MC-CWE.
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(b) An instance of uniform budget additive bidders with
identical budgets that admits no Walrasian equilibrium.
Figure 2: Instances of uniform budget-additive agents. Agents and items are represented by thin and thick
nodes, respectively. An edge between an agent and item nodes means that the agent values the item. Values
written next to agents and items correspond to budgets and (uniform) values, respectively.
Proof. Consider the instance given in Figure 2(a) with 5 players, {ci}i=1..5 (thin nodes), and 4 items, {ai}i=1..4
(thick nodes). The value written next to an agent node (resp., item node) corresponds to agent’s budget (resp.,
item’s value). If an agent values some item, we draw an edge between the agent and item.
In this example, the optimal fractional assignment has social welfare 8 (for example, the following
achieves welfare 8: c1 gets sets {a1} and {a2} with probability 1/2 each, c2 gets sets {a2} and {a3, a4}
with probability 1/2 each, and c4 gets sets {a3} and {a4} with probability 1/2 each). However, the optimal
integral assignment obtains value 8 − ǫ (for example, in one optimal assignment c1 gets {a1}, c2 gets {a2},
c4 gets {a4}, and c3 gets {a3}). Therefore, in order to get a MC-CWE outcome, one must bundle some items
together. We claim that, for any bundling choice, one cannot achieve a higher welfare than 7. The argument
proceeds via a case analysis:
1. If the bundle is {a1, a2}, then if it is allocated to c1 its contribution is 3, and the total value of other
items is 4, for a total of 7. If {a1, a2} is allocated to c2 then one of a3 or a4 must be allocated to a
player of budget 1− ǫ, and hence the total value is at most 4 + 2 + 1− ǫ < 7.
2. If the bundle is {a2, a3} or {a2, a4}, then the bundle can contribute at most 4 to the total welfare, and
the total value of other items is 3, for a total of 7.
3. If the bundle is {a3, a4}, then if it is allocated to c4 its contribution is 2 and the total value of other
items is 5 for a total of 7. If it is allocated to c2 then the only other player who can obtain value is c1
with a budget of 3, so the total value is at most 4 + 3 = 7.
4. If the bundle is {a1, a3} or {a1, a4}, say {a1, a3}, then if the bundle is allocated to c1 or c3 then its
value is at most 1, which leads to total value at most 7 since the other items have value 6. If the bundle
is allocated to c2 (for a value of 2) then a2 can contribute value at most 3 and a4 can contribute value at
most 2, for a total of 7. Finally, if the bundle is allocated to c4 then whichever of the remaining items
is not allocated to c2 will contribute one less than its value to the total, and hence the total value is at
most 2 + 2 + 4− 1 = 7.
We conclude that every possible bundling and allocation results in a welfare of at most 7, and hence the gap
is established.
We next present an algorithm that converts any allocation into a MC-CWE allocation while preserving
at least half of the original welfare. The algorithm, presented as Algorithm 3, proceeds as follows. Given
an allocation profile x = (x1, . . . , xn), the algorithm checks whether there is an instance in which vj(xi) >
vi(xi). Note that this can occur only if
∑
k∈xi
vk > Bi and Bj > Bi. If there is no such instance, then the
algorithm terminates and the current allocation is returned. Otherwise, if there is a pair of agents i and j with
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Algorithm 3 UniformBudgetAdditiveMC-CWE
Require: Uniform budget additive valuations v1, . . . , vn, agent budgets B1, . . . , Bn, and an allocation profile
x = (x1, . . . , xn) (w.l.o.g., every item is allocated to a player with positive value for it).
1: Initialize S ← ∅
2: if
∑
k∈xi
vi(k) ≤ Bi for every i then
3: return x
4: else
5: for i ∈ [n], in a non-decreasing order of Bi do
6: S ← {j ∈ xi : ∃i′ s.t. vi′(j) > 0 and Bi′ > Bi}
7: while
∑
k∈xi
vi(k) > Bi and S 6= ∅ do
8: j ← argminj∈S{vj}
9: i′ ← argmaxi∈[n]{Bi : vi(j) > 0}
10: xi ← xi − j, S ← S − j, xi′ ← xi′ ∪ j (i.e., move j from xi to xi′)
11: end while
12: end for
13: return x
14: end if
vj(xi) > vi(xi), then the item of lowest value in xi is removed from xi and added to xj . The algorithm then
repeats. Note that the algorithm must terminate, since every iteration results in an item being shifted from
one agent to another agent with strictly larger budget.
The intuition behind UniformBudgetAdditiveMC-CWE is that we would like to reduce the social welfare
of the optimal fractional allocation of the bundles in x. Indeed, if there are no instances in which vj(xi) >
vi(xi), then it must be that the assignment x is an optimal fractional allocation, and hence by Claim 2.1 is
MC-CWE. Thus, by transforming the input allocation into an allocation that satisfies this property, we are
reducing the integrality gap of our reduced market to 1. What remains to show is that this iterative procedure
does not drastically reduce the welfare of the allocation.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose x is an arbitrary allocation with welfare SW (x). Given x, Algorithm UniformBudgetAdditiveMC-
CWE returns, in polynomial time, a MC-CWE outcome x′ such that SW (x′) ≥ 12SW (x).
Proof. First, note that we can assume without loss of generality that x′ is such that j ∈ x′i implies vi(j) > 0
(else, take any object j such that j ∈ x′i and vi(j) = 0 and re-allocate it to an arbitrary agent with non-zero
value for it; this cannot reduce welfare).
We next prove that vi(x′i) = maxℓ∈[n] vℓ(x′i) for every i ∈ [n]. If
∑
j∈x′i
vj does not exceed Bi, then
vi(x
′
i) is clearly the largest possible value of x′i by any agent. If
∑
j∈x′i
vj exceeds Bi, then vi(x′i) = Bi.
Assume toward contradiction that there exists an agent i′ such that vi′(x′i) > vi(x′i). This implies that
Bi′ > Bi and there exists an item j ∈ x′i such that vi′(j) > 0. But if this were the case, item j would have
moved to an agent with higher budget in line 10 of the algorithm; reaching a contradiction. It follows that the
optimal fractional allocation of bundles x′ achieves the same social welfare of allocation x′, and hence x′ is
CWE.
It remains to prove that SW (x′) ≥ 12SW (x). Since the mechanism moves items in a non-decreasing
order, and vi(j) ≤ Bi for every i, j, it is guaranteed that every agent i that exceeds his budget in x, is left
with value of at least Bi/2 in x′. The desired approximation follows.
As a corollary, the known 4/3 approximation algorithm for budget-additive valuations can be turned into
an 8/3 approximation MC-CWE mechanism in the case of uniform values. Furthermore, the allocation re-
turned by Algorithm UniformBudgetAdditiveMC-CWE has the property that the full surplus can be extracted
from the MC-CWE outcome as revenue.
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Lemma 4.3. If agents are sub-additive and x is an allocation such that vi(xi) = maxℓ∈[n] vℓ(xi) for every
i ∈ [n], then the price vector pi = vi(xi) is such that (x, p) is MC-CWE.
Proof. Pick any agent i and set of agents S. Since for every i, vi(xi) = maxℓ∈[n] vℓ(xi), it follows that∑
j∈S vi(xj)−
∑
j∈S vj(xj) ≤ 0. We get:
vi(xi)− pi = 0 ≥
∑
j∈S
vi(xj)−
∑
j∈S
vj(xj) =
∑
j∈S
vi(xj)−
∑
j∈S
pj
≥ vi(∪j∈Sxj)−
∑
j∈S
pj,
where the last inequality follows from sub-additivity. The assertion of the lemma follows.
As a corollary, we get the following approximation result.
Corollary 4.4. For every instance of uniform budget-additive valuations, there exists a poly-time mechanism
that generates a MC-CWE outcome that is within factor 8/3 of the optimal revenue.
Proof. We have shown that one can turn the 4/3 SW-approximation algorithm for budget-additive valuations
into an 8/3 SW-approximation CWE mechanism that has the property vi(xi) = maxℓ∈[n] vℓ(xi) for every
i ∈ [n]. The last lemma implies that the full surplus can be extracted by a CWE mechanism. Observing that
the social welfare is an upper bound on the profit establishes the assertion of the corollary.
4.2 Identical Budgets
In this section we study the restricted case of identical budgets. We note that the welfare maximization prob-
lem is NP-hard, even under this restriction, as it includes PARTITION as a special case3. Moreover, we shall
show that there are input instances in this class for which Walrasian equilibria do not exist4. Nevertheless,
we shall show that any allocation can be transformed into a MC-CWE allocation with no loss to the social
welfare.
We first show that there exist input instances for which no Walrasian equilibrium exists. Consider the
instance given in Figure 2(b) with 4 players, ci, di for i ∈ {1, 2}, and 7 items: ai, bi, αi, and β for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Each player has budget 2. Each item has value 1, except for item β which has value 2. For i ∈ {1, 2}, player
ci has value for objects ai, bi, and αi, and player di has value for objects ai, bi, and β. In this example, the
optimal fractional assignment has social welfare 8. For example, the fractional assignment in which ci gets
sets {ai, αi} and {bi, αi} with probability 1/2, and di gets sets {ai, bi} and {β} with probability 1/2, for
i ∈ {1, 2}, achieves welfare 8. However, the optimal integral assignment obtains value at most 7. Thus the
optimal fractional welfare does not occur at an integral solution, and hence a WE does not exist.
We now show that, for any allocation, there exists a MC-CWE allocation that obtains at least as much
social welfare, and moreover this MC-CWE allocation can be found efficiently.
Theorem 4.5. Suppose x is an arbitrary allocation. There exists MC-CWE allocation x′ with SW (x′) ≥
SW (x), and x′ can be found in polynomial time given x.
Proof. Given x, we construct x′ by taking any object j such that j ∈ xi with vi(j) = 0 and re-allocating it
to an arbitrary agent with non-zero value for it. This can be done in polytime and can only increase the social
welfare of the resulting allocation. It remains to show that this allocation is MC-CWE.
3For a given instance of PARTITION with integers a1, . . . , an such that
∑
j∈[n] aj = 2B, construct an instance of our problem
with two agents, each with budget B, and n items, with item j having value aj .
4While this is well known for the case of arbitrary budget additive valuations, here we consider the further restricted class of
uniform values and identical budgets.
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Suppose x′ is such that j ∈ x′i implies vi(j) > 0. In this case, vi(x′i) = min{B,
∑
j∈x′i
vj} =
maxℓ vℓ(x
′
i) for each i. The social welfare of allocation x′ is therefore
∑
imaxℓ vℓ(x
′
i), which is an upper
bound on the value of any fractional assignment of bundles x′1, . . . , x′n. Thus the optimal fractional allocation
of these bundles obtains the same welfare as x′, and hence x′ is MC-CWE as required.
As a corollary, the known 4/3 approximation algorithms for budget-additive valuations can be made MC-
CWE for the case of uniform values and identical budgets. Note that the complementary case, in which the
budgets are identical but the item values are non-uniform, also has instances where no MC-CWE allocation
can achieve the welfare of an optimal allocation. Consider, for example, an instance with 3 players, c1, c2, c3,
each with budget 2, and 3 items, a1, a2, a3, where vc1(a1) = 2, vc1(a2) = vc1(a3) = 1, vc2(a2) = vc2(a3) =
2, and vc3(a1) = 4ǫ, vc3(a3) = ǫ (and all other values are zero). One can easily verify that there exists a
fractional solution that achieves welfare 4+2ǫ, while the highest welfare that can be obtained by any integral
solution is 4 + ǫ. However, by bundling together any two items, the highest achievable welfare is reduced to
at most 4.
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A Relation to envy-free (EF) notions
The MC-CWE notion is closely related to several notions of envy freeness that have been extensively studied
in recent years. In what follows, we shall describe the difference and similarities between MC-CWE and
these notions.
Envy free 1 (EF1) (as in, e.g., [13, 14, 20, 29, 32]).
Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) be an allocation, and let p = (p1, . . . , pn) be prices, such that pi is the price of xi.
An outcome (x,p) is said to be EF1 if no agent wishes to switch her outcome with another; i.e., for every
i, j ∈ [n], vi(x1)− p(xi) ≥ vi(xj)− p(xj).
An obvious way to view the difference between MC-CWE and EF1 is that EF1 requires that no agent
envies a single other agent, while MC-CWE precludes envy in any set of other agents. However, a more
subtle examination reveals that any EF1 outcome can be extended to an outcome that exhibits the latter
(stronger) requirement, but only if one allows for arbitrary bundle prices. This is in stark contrast to the linear
prices required by MC-CWE. Moreover, MC-CWE, unlike EF1, requires market clearing.
Envy free 2 (EF2) (as in, e.g., [7, 12, 24]).
Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) be an allocation, and let p = (p1, . . . , pm) be item prices, assigning a price pj for
every j ∈ M . An outcome (x,p) is said to be EF2 if xi ∈ Di(p) for every i ∈ [n]. This notion entails the
first requirement of a Walrasian equilibrium, but does not require market clearing.
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MC-CWE is, on the one hand, a relaxation of this notion, as it allows for a pre-sale bundling phase. On
the other hand, it requires market clearing, whereas EF2 does not.
B Revenue enhancement
We now point out that revenue can increase substantially when we optimize revenue with respect to equilibria
with bundles, as opposed to the individual item prices of standard Walrasian equilibrium. For example,
consider a case with two bidders and three objects {a1, a2, a3}. Player 1’s valuation is given by v1(S) = 1
if a1 ∈ S, otherwise v1(S) = 0. Choose an arbitrarily large constant R. Then player 2’s valution is additive
up to a capacity of 2 objects, with values R − 1, R,R for items a1, a2, a3 respectively. In this example,
both players satisfy gross substitutes, and the efficient allocation is ({a1}, {a2, a3}). This allocation can be
supported by a Walrasian equilibrium, and the maximum supporting prices are p1 = 1, p2 = 2, p3 = 2, for a
total revenue of 5. However, the revenue-maximizing MC-CWE prices set the price of {a1} to 1 and the price
of {a2, a3} to R+ 2, for a total revenue of R+ 3. This gap can be made arbitrarily large by increasing R.
C Necessity of Bundling
We show by way of example that the use of bundling is necessary for the statement of Theorem 3.1, even if
we relax the market-clearing requirement of Walrasian equilibrium and even for single-minded bidders. We
present an auction instance such that, for any set of item prices for which agent demand sets are disjoint, the
social welfare of the resulting allocation is an O(
√
m) fraction of the optimal social welfare.
Example 1. Consider a combinatorial auction with n =
√
m + 1 single-minded bidders, as follows. One
bidder desires set M for a value of m. Each of the remaining bidders i desires a set Si of size √m, for a
value of 1+ 2√m. These sets have the property that |Si ∩ Sj| = 1 for all i 6= j, and for every object a ∈M ,
a is contained in at most 2 sets; the existence of such sets follows easily by induction on their size5.
The optimal outcome allocates all objects to the first bidder, for a total value of m. Suppose this optimal
outcome can be supported by item prices p. Then
∑
a∈M pa ≤ m, but a counting argument demonstrates
that for some set Si, it must be that
∑
a∈Si
pa ≤ 2
√
m < 1 + 2
√
m. Player i would demand set Si at these
prices, a contradiction. Thus, at any pricing equilibrium, some set Si must be allocated to a buyer i; but this
implies that no other set Sj can be allocated, as Sj ∩ Si 6= ∅ for all j 6= i. Thus the total social welfare at
any equilibrium outcome with item prices is at most 1 + 2
√
m.
5That is, that there exist t sets of size t with this property, for all t ≤ √m.
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